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1 Introduction
A multinational enterprise (MNE) considering entry into a foreign market
faces two fundamental decisions. First, it has to choose the level of control
over its local engagement. Equity-based entry could take the form of partially
owned subsidiaries, as in joint ventures, or wholly owned subsidiaries, while
non-equity entry would be licensing for example. Second, the MNE has to
decide which mode of foreign entry to carry out. It can choose between the
acquisition of an existing company or setting up a new venture via greenfield
investment. Why would a multinational firm choose to enter one market via
acquisition and another one through greenfield investment, while in principle
for either market both alternatives are present?
This paper contributes to answering this question by providing a simple
model to analyze determinants of the optimal entry mode. For this purpose
we consider the decision to enter a market either via a greenfield investment
or the acquisition of a single local competitor. While a general analysis of this
strategic choice is provided, the specifications of the model especially allow
us to apply its implications on the decision to enter a market in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE).
Most of the literature on foreign entry has focused on the first decision in
considering the choice of ownership type between licensing, a wholly owned
subsidiary, and a joint venture. These modes of entry differ considerably in
their level of control, resource commitment, and risk. Anderson and Gatignon
[1986], for example, analyze the tradeoff between control and the cost of
resource commitment in a transaction cost framework. They argue that a
greater level of control is more efficient for highly transaction-specific assets.
Hill, Hwang and Kim [1990] present a wider approach which additionally
takes into account global strategies of the MNE and the risk of dissemination
of firm specific knowledge as factors influencing the control decision. Firms
will prefer high control entry modes if they persue global strategies or possess
a highly firm-specific know-how.
Relatively few studies have addressed the choice between greenfield in-
vestment and acquisition as modes of foreign entry. Empirically a variety
of potential factors influencing the choice of entry mode have been studied.
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Kogut and Singh [1988], for example, study the influence of cultural distance
on the choice between greenfield investment, acquisition and joint venture.
The greater the cultural distance between the country of the investor and
the country of entry, the more likely a firm will choose a joint venture or a
greenfield investment over an acquisition. Other work considers additional
firm-specific factors like international experience, firm size or R&D. Caves
and Mehra [1986] and Zejan [1990] find evidence that large and diversified
companies prefer acquisition. Besides that acquisition is favored for entry
into rapidly growing or very slow growing markets. Hennart and Park [1993]
and Andersson and Svensson [1994] show that firms with higher R&D inten-
sity are more likely to choose greenfield investment.
Focusing on the specific conditions in transition economies Estrin, Hughes
and Todd [1997] and Meyer [1998] empirically analyze the choices of owner-
ship form and mode of entry into CEE. Estrin et al. [1997] find that most
of the MNEs in their sample aimed to achieve 100 per cent ownership even
if initially, e.g. for political reasons, not possible. Meyer [1998] tests a num-
ber of hypotheses for CEE entry, which are based on previous work in the
international business literature. Surprisingly, he finds that entry into fast-
growing industries takes place via wholly owned greenfield investments, but
not via acquisition. This is in contrast to the well known argument that a
speedy entry, which is assumed important in fast-growing industries, can be
achieved by acquisition and not via greenfield investment. It also contrasts
the empirical findings by Caves and Mehra [1986] for US entry. Therefore, it
suggests that industrial growth in transition economies creates specific con-
ditions for competition that are different from other markets. The study
also shows that greenfield investment is the most common mode of entry
into CEE, accounting for more than 50 per cent of all projects in the sam-
ple. This is particularly surprising in the light of a worldwide trend towards
acquisition and it underlines the need for a theoretical analysis.1
There only exist few theoretical approaches to the choice of foreign en-
try. Horn and Persson [2001a] analyze the equilibrium market structure in
1Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) constitute an important mode of entry and their
importance has increased over time (UNCTAD [2000]).
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an international oligopoly and focus on the question under which circum-
stances cross-border M&A or domestic M&A evolve.2 They do not, however,
consider greenfield investment as an alternative mode of entry. Buckley and
Casson [1998] analyze the choice among a variety of alternative entry modes.
One important conclusion is that the market structure as well as the strength
of competition in the market each have a crucial impact on the entry deci-
sion. Entry through greenfield investment contributes to the local capacity
and intensifies competition, while acquisition entry does not. The existence
of a high cost of competition associated with high monopoly rents makes ac-
quisition favorable over greenfield investment. A highly specific production
technology of the entrant resulting in higher adaptation costs, on the other
hand, discourages acquisition and favors greenfield investment.
Go¨rg [2000] builds on their approach in analyzing the effect of market
structure on the choice between greenfield investment and acquisition in a
Cournot-type setting. He shows that in general acquisition may be the pref-
ered mode of entry, while only with a high cost of adaptation greenfield
investment may be an optimal choice.
While Buckley and Casson [1998] determine market structure and strength
of competition as important factors, they are not able to specify exactly how
these factors affect the entry mode decision. In contrast to their approach
the present model does so. We study the choice of entry mode of a MNE
between setting up a new venture via greenfield investment or acquisition
of the single local competitor. A greenfield investment enables the MNE to
specify the subsidiary according to its technological capabilities, while acqui-
sition allows at first only to use the given facilities. In the model presented
below this fact is reflected in that the MNE possesses a superior technology,
but can only make use of it when entering via greenfield. In case of acquisi-
tion it is restricted to the acquired firms technological capabilities. After the
acquisition of the only competitor the MNE can act as a monopolist, while
greenfield investment in general leads to a competitive situation. In addition
to the endogenous effect of the market structure associated with the entry
mode, the influence of an exogenous change in the competition intensity on
2See Horn and Persson [2001b] for a game-theoretic analysis of merger formation.
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the entry decision is analyzed. Contrasting Buckley and Casson [1998] or
Go¨rg [2000], we derive the acquisition price for an existing domestic firm as
well as the profits for the alternative entry modes endogenously. These values
obviously depend on the market structure, the competition intensity in the
market and differentials in the production cost of the competing firms.
The effects of the different exogenous variables defined in the model on
the entry decision are analyzed in detail. Increasing the investment cost
of greenfield entry obviously makes acquisition more attractive. We show
that this effect only holds up to a certain amount. If it gets too large,
however, acquisition becomes unattractive and no entry will be an optimal
choice. A higher technological backwardness of the domestic firm leads to
a higher profit for the MNE in competition, a lower acquisition price and
a lower monopoly profit for acquisition entry. Whether or not one of these
effects dominates is a priori not clear. But we can show that greenfield
investment is the optimal mode of entry only if the technological gap between
the competitors is sufficiently large. Surprisingly, we furthermore find that
the competition intensity within a market can influence the choice of entry
mode in a non-monotonic fashion. When the market is very much or very
little competitive, greenfield investment is the optimal entry mode, while for
intermediate values it is acquisition.
With respect to the unusual empirical observations of entry mode deci-
sions into countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the results presented in
the model have some explanatory power. As the analysis shows greenfield
investment is the optimal mode of entry only if the technological gap between
the domestic firm and the MNE is sufficiently large. This is certainly the case
in many markets in CEE, and may explain, why entry into these countries
foremost takes place via greenfield investment - in opposition to the world-
wide trend. Moreover, it is observed that entry into fast-growing industries
surprisingly takes place via greenfield investment, but not via acquisition.
Since one can associate fast-growing industries with less intense competition
the model exactly predicts that greenfield investment is the optimal mode of
entry in this situation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up
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the model. Section 3 considers the decision between greenfield investment
and acquisition and presents the main results. Section 4 discusses some of
the empirical observations and concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework to analyze the choice
of entry mode for a multinational enterprise entering into a foreign country.
Therefore, the focus is on the second decision a MNE faces, while 100 per cent
ownership is assumed to be the desired level of control. We consider a model
of horizontal product differentiation a` la Hotelling [1929] with firms compet-
ing in prices.3 Consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed along the
unit interval [0,1] with density 1. Thus, the total number of consumers is
equal to 1.
The model consists of two periods. In period 1, the domestic firm 1
located at x = 0 serves (at least part of) the market. The foreign firm 2
considers whether or not to enter the market and, in case of entry, which
entry mode to employ. The market is assumed to be stable in the sense that
firm 1 cannot adopt a different production technology or set up a new venture
and there is no other potential entrant besides firm 2. To enter the market
firm 2 can either acquire firm 1 at location x = 0 or set up a new venture
at x = 1 through a greenfield investment. In period 2, firms simultaneously
compete in prices, when firm 2 entered via greenfield investment. Otherwise
firm 2 will employ its monopoly pricing strategy.
Firm i = 1, 2 produces with constant marginal cost ci. Production takes
place without any fixed cost. The entering MNE employs a superior tech-
nology than the domestic firm (c1 > c2 ≥ 0). Without this assumption the
results would be trivial as will become clear in what follows. But besides
that, it nicely fits to the common observation that domestic firms in CEE
possess less efficient technologies compared to MNEs. When entering by ac-
quisition it is assumed that the entrant can only make use of the acquired
3However, we introduce cost asymmetry among firms to the basic Hotelling model.
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firm’s technology c1.
4 On the other hand, when setting up a new venture,
firm 2 can obviously implement its own technology c2.
Entry is viable if the entrant can earn a post-entry profit at least covering
the cost of entry. Foreign market entry requires a substantial investment
into physical capital, marketing etc., especially a greenfield entry. The cost
of entry via greenfield investment is denoted by k ≥ 0. The entry cost in
case of acquisition is equal to the acquisition price because of the assumption
that the entrant uses technology c1 and does not bear any adaptation cost
or restructuring cost. The acquisition price, denoted by PA, is determined
endogenously. To keep things simple it is assumed the entrant can make a
take-it-or-leave-it-offer to acquire firm 1.5
The time structure of the entry game in period 1 is the following.
At stage 1, firm 2 (MNE) can choose between making a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to acquire firm 1, greenfield investment or no market entry.
At stage 2, if firm 2 has made an offer, the incumbent firm 1 can accept or
reject the offer.
At stage 3, firm 2 can again choose between greenfield investment or no entry
in case firm 1 has turned the offer down.
At stage 4, firms compete in prices and profits are realized.
We look for a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game just
described and therefore solve by backwards induction. If the entrant can
4It could also be assumed that the entrant can implement its own technology at a certain
adaptation cost. This would not alter the results but make the model more complicated
by adding extra variables. In our model, firm 2 bears some kind of adaptation cost caused
by the fact that only the inferior technology can be used which in turn yields lower profits
than employing the superior technology.
5The acquisition price obviously depends on the bargaining power of the entrant and
the incumbent. Other bargaining solutions, where the domestic firm has some bargaining
power, would lead to a higher acquisition price and therefore shift preferences of the
MNE in favor of greenfield investment. The other extreme case would be a situation,
as argued by Grossman and Hart [1980], where shareholders would not tender their share
below the post acquisition value of the firm. Thus, the free rider problem would render the
acquisition infeasible unless the acquiring firm initially holds some of the shares. Assuming
full bargaining power of the entrant instead, at least constitutes a lower bound for the
acquisition price.
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credibly commit to greenfield entry if its offer is rejected, then the acquisition
price PA will clearly be equal to firm 1’s post-greenfield profit. The entrant
can only credibly commit to a greenfield entry if this yields a non-negative
net profit. To put it in other words, k must not be too large. Otherwise the
entrant cannot commit to greenfield entry. Thus, the acquisition price will
be equal to firm 1’s monopoly profit in this case.
Consumers incur a linear transportation cost t if they buy the good from
one of the firms. The higher the transportation cost, the more differentiated
are the goods and the less intense is the price competition. The parameter t
can be interpreted as a measure of competition intensity in the market. The
larger the value of t, the less intense is the competition and vice versa. If
t = 0 we essentially have Bertrand competition. Each consumer wants to
buy exactly one unit of the good in every period if its price is not too high.
Consumers’ surplus from consumption is denoted by s. Let pi denote the
price charged by firm i = 1, 2. Hence, in case of a greenfield investment the
net utility of a consumer located at x is
U =

s− xt− p1 if good is bought from firm 1,
s− (1− x)t− p2 if good is bought from firm 2,
0 if good is not bought.
In case of acquisition the net utility of a consumer located at x becomes
U =
 s− xt− p2 if good is bought from firm 2,0 if good is not bought.
Two additional assumptions are made concerning the consumers’ surplus:
1. The consumers’ surplus is sufficiently large, such that firm 2 would like
to serve the entire market when using its own technology: s ≥ c2 + 2t.
2. For c1 ≥ s, firm 1 is not in the market from the beginning.
The first assumption excludes cases that are characterized by very weak
competition intensity. Since we would like to analyze the effect of competition
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intensity these situations are of little interest.6 The second assumption is on
the one hand very intuitive in that a firm operating with a loss for certain
will not be in the market.7 On the other hand, it enriches the analysis by
considering the observation that the entry decision is also restricted by a
limited supply of potential acquisition targets. In this situation the entrant
can only choose to enter the market through greenfield investment or not to
enter the market at all.
As argued before, entry is viable if the post-entry profit at least covers the
cost of entry. Acquisition is a better alternative than greenfield investment
if the net post-entry profit of the former is higher than of the latter entry
mode. In what follows we consider the effects of the models parameters on
the optimal entry mode decision. The profits for the alternative entry modes
and the optimal decision are determined in the Appendix.
3 Greenfield Investment versus Acquisition
What are the driving forces determining the optimal entry mode decision?
All of the model’s parameters enter into the decision function. In principle,
there are three crucial values, that are essential for the decision. These values
are the acquisition price, the monopoly profit in case of acquisition, and the
net greenfield profit. As will be seen below, there are some fairly obvious
results concerning the impact of certain parameters on these values, while
others enter into the decision in a non-trivial fashion.
We now look at the different exogenous variables that affect the choice of
greenfield investment versus acquisition in term. We start with considering
the investment cost k. The investment cost is crucial for the determina-
6However, as will become clear shortly, for very weak competition intensity either
greenfield investment or no entry is the optimal choice.
7In the case of state-owned firms, especially for CEE countries, it could be argued that
a firm would even be in the market when making a loss for sure and the state had carried
this loss. Within the assumptions of this model the entrant would never acquire such a
firm. In a post-greenfield situation this firm would no longer be in the market unless the
state would bear an even higher loss. This scenario is not part of our analysis.
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tion of the acquisition price and therefore the achievable profit under both
alternative entry modes. It is straightforward to see that, as k increases, ac-
quisition becomes relatively more attractive. Surprisingly, however, if k gets
too large, acquisition becomes unattractive and the entrant prefers not to
enter the market at all. What is the reason for this counterintuitive result?
The greenfield profit piG2 is strictly decreasing in k. Note that for a certain
investment cost k = k¯ this profit becomes equal to zero. Thus, for k ≥ k¯
greenfield investment is no longer viable. This results in an acquisition price
equal to firm 1’s monopoly profit. Therefore, acquisition has no advantage
over no entry and the entrant chooses not to enter at all. This result is
summarized in the following proposition.8
Proposition 1 There exists a k¯(s, c1, c2, t), such that for k < k¯ an increase
in k makes acquisition more attractive relative to greenfield investment. For
k ≥ k¯ the entrant prefers not to enter at all.
This result is surprising on first sight since it states, that acquisition really
only is an option for market entry, if a greenfield entry is also profitable.
In other words market entry will be an optimal decision only if greenfield
investment would be viable.9
How does the technology parameter c1 affect the mode of entry decision?
Since the entrant can, in case of acquisition, only make use of the inferior
technology c1, this production cost directly influences all crucial values. This
means c1 has an effect on the acquisition price PA, the monopoly profit in
case of acquisition piM1 and the greenfield profit pi
G
2 .
10 A priori one might
expect, that an increase in c1 makes greenfield investment relatively more
attractive compared to acquisition since the monopoly profit decreases, while
the greenfield profit increases. On the other hand, the acquisition price also
decreases in c1.
8See also Figure 1 in the Appendix which highlights the optimal decision for certain
parameter values. The dotted line in the bottom area displays k¯.
9See Appendix for an exact determination of k¯ in the different parameter cases.
10The subscript 1 for the monopoly profit in case of acquisition indicates that technology
c1 is used.
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Lemma 1 Increasing c1 has a strictly positive effect on the greenfield profit
piG2 , a non-positive effect on the acquisition price PA, and a strictly negative
effect on the monopoly profit piM1 :
dpiG2
dc1
> 0;
dPA
dc1
≤ 0; dpi
M
1
dc1
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The positive effect on the greenfield profit is very intuitive since increasing
the production cost for the incumbent leads to an improved position for the
entrant in competition. Also there is certainly a non-positive effect on the
acquisition price as well as a negative one on the monopoly profit. From
the point of view of the entrant, a more inferior competitive position of the
incumbent makes greenfield investment more attractive. On the other hand,
acquisition gets cheaper since the acquisition price (weakly) decreases, but
at the same time the gross profit in case of acquisition piM1 strictly decreases.
A priori it is not clear if (and which) one of the effects on the crucial values
dominates. However, there is an unambiguous tendency, as the following
lemma states.
Lemma 2 The effect of an increase in c1 on the monopoly profit pi
M
1 (weakly)
dominates the effect on the acquisition price PA and therefore the net acqui-
sition profit piA2 (weakly) decreases in c1:∣∣∣∣∣dpiM1dc1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣dPAdc1
∣∣∣∣∣⇔ dpiA2dc1 ≤ 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The effect on the acquisition price PA is equal to the effect on the gross profit
piM1 only in Case 3 (b), since then both values are equal. In all other cases
the latter effect strictly dominates the former. Therefore, except for the case
in which acquisition and no entry yield the same profit, the acquisition profit
strictly decreases in c1. Given these results the following proposition can be
claimed.11
11See Figure 1 in the Appendix for an illustration of the result.
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Proposition 2 For k < k¯ there exists a c¯1(s, c2, t, k), such that
(a) for c1 ≤ c¯1 acquisition is the optimal mode of entry and
(b) for c1 > c¯1 greenfield investment is the optimal mode of entry.
Proof: See Appendix.
For very similar technologies (c1 ≤ c¯1) it is obvious that acquisition is always
favorable over a greenfield investment, since then greenfield investment leads
to a relatively low profit for the entrant, while the achievable monopoly profit
using technology c1 is high. When increasing c1 for a given c2, and therefore
increasing the technology difference, Lemma 2 applies. Thus, for sufficiently
different technologies, greenfield investment is the optimal mode of entry. At
the same time the investment cost k should not be too large, since it directly
reduces the net profit for greenfield entry.
Next, we consider the effect of the consumers’ surplus s on the decision of
entry mode. This variable naturally has an impact on the profits that can be
achieved. Obviously, the monopoly profit should increase in the value of s.
On the other hand, one could expect the greenfield profit and the acquisition
price to react in the same manner. However, as the following lemma shows
this is not in general the case.
Lemma 3 Increasing s results in
(i) a strictly positive effect on the monopoly profit piM1 and a (weakly) pos-
itive effect on the acquisition profit piA2 ,
dpiM1
ds
> 0;
dpiA2
ds
≥ 0,
(ii) no effect on the greenfield profit piG2 or the acquisition price PA for
s ≥ 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t),
dpiG2
ds
= 0;
dPA
ds
= 0,
but strictly positive effects for s < 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t),
dpiG2
ds
> 0;
dPA
ds
> 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
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The following proposition describes the effect of an increase in s on the
decision of entry mode.12
Proposition 3 For k < k¯ there exists a finite s¯(c1, c2, t, k), such that acqui-
sition is the optimal mode of entry for all s ≥ s¯.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is fairly simple. The higher the gross benefit
for the consumers, the higher the monopoly profit becomes. On the other
hand, above a certain value of s the greenfield profit as well as the acquisition
price are no longer affected by an increase in s, since these values become
independent of s.13 Thus, there exists a value s¯(c1, c2, t, k) above which
acquisition will be strictly better than greenfield investment. But this result
is only valid as long as a greenfield investment would be viable, too, i.e.
k < k¯.
The result presented in Proposition 3 is surprising since it claims that the
entry mode decision depends on the consumers’ surplus in an unexpected way.
In particular, it implies that for two products, differing only with respect to
consumers’ gross benefit, in the market for one good greenfield investment
might be the optimal choice, while in the other one it is acquisition. More-
over, if consumers in different regions would associate the same product with
different valuations, the same effect on the entry decision could apply.
How does the optimal entry mode decision change with a change in the
competition intensity t? Obviously, the effect of an increase in t on the
monopoly profit is always negative. The effects on the other crucial val-
ues, however, are not as clearcut. In particular, for increasing t (decreasing
competition intensity) the effect on the acquisition price is inverse U-shaped,
while the effect on the greenfield profit and the acquisition profit is U-shaped.
A priori it is not clear how these opposing effects influence the optimal entry
mode choice. As one result of this we can show that under certain conditions
12Figure 2 in the Appendix highlights the results claimed in the following three propo-
sitions for certain parameter values.
13As claimed in Lemma 3. The reason for this is the equilibrium in price strategies
which is independent of s in Case 1 and Case 2.
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there is a non-monotonic relation between the competition intensity param-
eter t and the entry decision. When considering the effect of the competition
intensity again the consumers’ surplus plays an important role. Two interest-
ing results follow for different levels of consumers’ benefit. We first consider
a situation with a relatively high value of consumers’ surplus (s ≥ sˆ) and
sufficiently low investment cost (k ≤ kˆ). A formal definition of sˆ and kˆ is
given in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 For s ≥ sˆ and k ≤ kˆ there exists a t¯(s, c1, c2, k), such that
(a) for t ≤ t¯ acquisition is the optimal mode of entry and
(b) for t > t¯ greenfield investment is the optimal mode of entry.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result claims that for a sufficiently high consumers’ gross benefit s and
investment cost k not too high the optimal mode of entry is acquisition
for higher competition intensities, while it is greenfield investment for low
competition intensity. Thus, there exists a certain cutoff value for t that de-
termines whether one or the other entry mode constitutes an optimal choice.
The first part of the result is related to Proposition 3, which stated that there
exists a value s¯, such that acquisition is the optimal mode of entry for all
s ≥ s¯. We can find a value sˆ ≥ s¯ for high competition intensity. Decreasing
the competition intensity (increasing t) for the very same value of sˆ results
in a negative effect on the net acquisition profit and a positive effect on the
greenfield profit. The reason for the former effect is that a lower competition
intensity results in a higher acquisition price and at the same time a lower
monopoly profit. The latter effect is due to the fact that lower competi-
tion intensity results in higher profits. Further decreasing the competition
intensity eventually leads to greenfield investment as the optimal choice.
The result suggests that for two different markets that are only distin-
guished by different levels of competition intensity, in one market acquisition
may be the optimal choice, while it is greenfield investment in the other.
This provides another possible explanation as for why entry modes should
differ for entry into different markets.
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Now we come to the second result concerning the effect of the competition
intensity for lower values of s. The following proposition shows that the
competition intensity, surprisingly, has a non-monotonic impact on the entry
mode decision.
Proposition 5 For s ∈ (s, s˜) and k ∈ (1
3
(c1 − c2), 35(c1 − c2)] there exist
t(s, c1, c2, k) and t˜(s, c1, c2, k), such that the optimal entry mode is
(a) greenfield investment for very intense competition, t ≤ t,
(b) acquisition for intermediate competition intensities, t ∈ (t, t˜), and
(c) greenfield investment for low competition intensity, t ≥ t˜,
where s = c1 + 2
√
1
3
(c1 − c2)(23(c1 − c2)− k) and s˜ = 2c1 − c2 − k.
Proof: See Appendix.
The proposition shows that under certain conditions the competition inten-
sity affects the optimal entry mode decision in a non-monotonic fashion.14
Greenfield investment is the prefered mode of entry, when the market is very
much or very little competitive. For intermediate values acquisition is the
optimal entry mode. To understand the intuition for this interesting result
we will consider the effects of competition on the three crucial values, i.e. the
acquisition price, the monopoly profit, and the greenfield profit.
If competition is very fierce, the acquisition price is equal to zero and at
the same time the greenfield profit is large. The reason for this is that by
greenfield investment MNE is be able to force the incumbent firm out of the
market because of the technological advantage it possesses. The monopoly
profit is comparably low because of the assumed low consumer surplus and
the restriction to the inferior technology. Therefore, greenfield investment
is the optimal entry mode even though acquisition comes at a price of zero.
For intermediate values the acquisition price is still very small. But the
14For k > 35 (c1 − c2) there can even exist - at least for some s within the interval -
a tˆ(s, c1, c2, k) such that for t ∈ (t˜, tˆ) greenfield investment is the optimal choice and for
t ≥ tˆ it is no entry.
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greenfield profit becomes much smaller since with less intense competition
the MNE can no longer force the incumbent out of the market. The monopoly
profit remains almost the same. Thus, acquisition becomes the optimal mode
of entry. When the market is very little competitive, greenfield investment
again becomes the optimal entry mode. The reason for this is that the firms
achieve more power over their consumers and therefore larger profits. As a
consequence the acquisition price as well as the greenfield profit increase.
To summarize the described effects of competition for low consumers’
surplus, we can argue that it is more important to use the superior technology
than to become a monopolist when the market is very little or very much
competitive and vice versa for intermediate values.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Although highly stylized the model presented above gives some useful new
insight into the determinants that affect the strategic choice of entry mode.
Our contribution to the literature on foreign entry is to establish a theoretical
framework that allows an in-depth analysis of the impact of various exogenous
factors in a simple setting. In particular, we are able to specify exactly how
the market structure and the competition intensity in a market influence
the entry decision. Even though previous work already identified both as
important factors, it was not able to characterize their exact impact. While
our analysis does so, it moreover shows that the influence of these factors is
not as straightforward as the literature suggests.
In principle, there exist three crucial values that determine the optimal
entry choice: The acquisition price, the monopoly profit when using the
inferior technology, and the net greenfield profit. We examined the different
exogenous variables specified in the model that affect these values.
First, we considered the cost associated with greenfield entry. Intuitively,
it could be argued that increasing this cost leads to acquisition becoming
more attractive. We showed that an increasing investment cost has this effect
only up to a certain point. If the cost gets too large, however, acquisition
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becomes unattractive and the entrant prefers not to enter the market at all.
Second, for the technology parameter of the domestic competitor, the
effect on the entry decision was a priori not clear since it has opposite effects
on the three crucial values already mentioned. An increase in the production
cost of the domestic firm has a positive effect on the entrants greenfield
profit, but negative effects on the monopoly profit and the acquisition price.
Nevertheless, we could show that the effect on the monopoly profit dominates
the effect on the acquisition price. Therefore, greenfield investment becomes
the optimal mode of entry if the difference in technological capabilities is
sufficiently large.
Third, the gross benefit for the consumers definitely has an impact on
the decision since it determines how much rents can be extracted from them.
The higher this benefit, the higher should become the achievable profits un-
der both entry modes. We showed that for a given constellation of the other
variables there exists a finite value for consumers’ surplus such that acquisi-
tion is the optimal mode of entry for all higher values. The reason for this
result is that the greenfield profit increases in the consumers benefit only up
to a certain point, but beyond it remains the same. As soon as it comes to
a situation where both firms cannot act as local monopolists their profits in
competition remain the same for all higher values of consumers’ surplus. The
result implies that, for two different product markets that are only distin-
guished by different levels of consumers’ surplus, it may well be the case that
in one market greenfield investment is the optimal mode, while in the other
one it is acquisition. This implication can help to explain why MNEs in some
markets employ the greenfield entry strategy and in others acquisition entry,
while in either both opportunities are present.
Fourth, the competition intensity in a market was characterized as one of
the most important factors concerning the decision of entry mode. There are
two situations to be distinguished, depending on consumers’ surplus. For a
sufficiently high consumers’ surplus we found that high competition intensity
leads to acquisition as the optimal mode of entry, but it is greenfield invest-
ment for low levels of competition. The reason for this result is that the
acquisition price and the greenfield profit increase with decreasing competi-
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tion, while the monopoly profit decreases. Less intensive competition results
in a reduced incentive to become a monopolist, while the technological ad-
vantage becomes more important. More surprisingly, however, we found that
the optimal mode of entry depends on the competition intensity in a non-
monotonic fashion, when consumers’ surplus is relatively low. Greenfield
investment is the optimal mode of entry, when the market is very much or
very little competitive, while it is acquisition for intermediate values. This
is caused by the fact that for lower consumers’ surplus it becomes more im-
portant to use the superior technology when the market is very much or very
little competitive, while it becomes more important to be a monopolist in
the intermediate case.
The present general analysis sheds some light on the empirical evidence
on the choice of foreign entry mode that has been provided recently. In
particular, we can give some explanation for the on first sight counterintuitive
observations for entry into countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The
empirical evidence suggests that these countries are characterized by specific
conditions for competition that differ from other markets.
Greenfield investment is the most common mode of entry into CEE as
Meyer [1998] derives from his data set. This is a surprising fact since there
is a recent trend towards acquisition worldwide observed. One possible ex-
planation could be that CEE countries lack potential acquisition targets for
those industries where greenfield investment took place. We provided other
additional explanations in the present paper. We showed that greenfield in-
vestment is an optimal choice if the local competitor possesses an inferior
technology. Since it is a common fact that firms in CEE do not have ac-
cess to state of the art technology, our model gives a nice explanation for
the observed situation. Moreover, our results characterize the exact market
conditions under which greenfield investment is the optimal mode of entry.
Entry into fast-growing industries in CEE, surprisingly, takes place via
greenfield investment, but not via acquisition. Intuitively, it should be argued
that, since the speed of entry is important in industries that are fast-growing,
acquisition should be prefered. Acquisition certainly provides a faster entry
and access to a market than greenfield investment. Again, it could be ar-
18
gued that the technological backwardness of domestic firms is the reason for
the counterintuitive behavior. Meyer [1998] suggests as possible explanations
that either the investment itself is the cause for the growth in the industry,
or growing industries can accommodate more entrants without frictions be-
tween competitors, or the highest growth occurred in until then neglected
industries. We showed that greenfield investment is an optimal choice if
the competition intensity is low. Since for fast-growing industries it is rea-
sonable to assume a low competition intensity, this provides an alternative
explanation for the empirical observation.
A possible extension of the model could be to include the entry decision of
more than one MNE, either simultaneously or sequentially. Despite this we
feel confident that the assumptions and conclusions of our model are relevant
for the entry mode decision and leave other considerations for future research.
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Appendix
A) The equilibria in price strategies
In order to compute the profits for the alternative entry modes, the equilibria
in price strategies have to be defined for the different situations. When firm 2
enters via acquisition it will afterwards employ its monopoly pricing strategy
using technology c1. That is p
M
2 = s−t for s ≥ c1+2t or pM2 = s+c12 otherwise.
In case of greenfield investment the equilibrium price strategies are:
• For c1 ≥ s firm 1 is not in the market and thus firm 2 chooses pM2 = s−t.
• Case 1: p1 = c1, p2 = c1 − t.
• Case 2: p1 = 2c1+c2+3t3 , p2 = 2c2+c1+3t3 .
• Case 3: (a) p1 = s− c2−c1+3t6 , p2 = s− c1−c2+3t6 .
(b) pM1 =
s+c1
2
, p2 =
3s−2t−c1
2
.
The first two cases display the common equilibrium price strategies in a
model of horizontal product differentiation. In Case 1 firm 2 can force the
incumbent out of the market and then faces all demand. In Case 2 there
exists a consumer with location x˜, who is indifferent between buying from
firm 1 or firm 2. In Case 3 things get a bit more complicated. The reason
for this is the assumed situation with constant but asymmetric marginal cost
for the two parties and the assumption that firm 2 would in principle like to
serve the whole market when using its own technology c2. On the other hand,
there is no restriction on the technological capabilities of firm 1 and therefore
Case 3 emerges as a possible situation. The distinction between Case 3 (a)
and (b) is that in the former firm 1’s monopoly supply is greater than x˜
and in the latter it is smaller. The defined equilibria are not unique, since
there exists a continuum of equilibria in an -environment close to them. Its
range depends on the exact constellation of parameters. However, the price
strategy combinations considered here always constitute an equilibrium for
each case. Furthermore, it easily can be shown, that the pricing strategies
for case (a) cannot be an equilibrium for case (b).
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B) Profits for the alternative entry modes
If firm 2 chooses to enter via greenfield investment its profit is determined
by the outcome of competition with the domestic firm net of the investment
cost k. On the other hand, if the firm enters via acquisition the profit is
determined by the monopoly profit when using the inferior technology c1 net
of the acquisition price PA. As argued before this acquisition price depends
on the ability of firm 2 to commit to greenfield entry in case its take-it-
or-leave-it offer is turned down. If the firm can commit to greenfield entry
the acquisition price is equal to firm 1’s post greenfield value - the profit
that can be achieved in competition with the MNE. Otherwise if the MNE
cannot commit to greenfield entry the acquisition price is equal to firm 1’s
monopoly profit. The results derived for acquisition entry assume that firm
2 can commit to greenfield entry. Otherwise firm 2 prefers not to enter.
1. Greenfield investment
For c1 ≥ s firm 1 is not in the market. Thus, firm 2’s profit becomes
piG2 = s− t− c2 − k.
Next, the situation is considered where firm 1 is in the market, that is s > c1.
At this point three case have to be distinguished: 1. If the price difference
between the two firms exceeds t along the whole interval, one firm has no
demand. 2. Otherwise both firms face a demand if s is sufficiently large, such
that all consumers want to buy one unit of the good. 3. Both firms possess
local monopoly power if s is not sufficiently large.
Case 1: Within the assumptions of this model there is only one case to be
considered, namely firm 2 facing all demand, p1−p2 > t.15 The firms’ profits
are
piG1 = 0,
piG2 = c1 − c2 − t− k.
15After inserting the equilibrium price strategies for Case 2 it follows that p1 − p2 >
t⇔ t < c1−c23 .
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Case 2: The price difference between the two firms does not exceed t, that
is p1 − p2 ≤ t, and s is sufficiently large.16 Thus, the firms’ profits are
piG1 =
(c2−c1+3t)2
18t
,
piG2 =
(c1−c2+3t)2
18t
− k.
The consumers’ surplus s is sufficiently large if s ≥ 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t). Thus,
there exists a consumer with location x˜ who is indifferent between buying
from firm 1 and buying from firm 2.17
Case 3: For s < 1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t) the consumer with location x˜, who would
have been indifferent between the two firms, would not buy if the firms were
to choose the competitive prices. Thus, both firms possess local monopoly
power. Depending on consumers’ surplus two more cases have to be distin-
guished: (a) The pricing strategies constitute an equilibrium such that the
consumer located at x˜ is indifferent between the firms and between buying
or not. (b) Firm 1 sets the monopoly price and firm 2 sets a price such
that there exists a consumer who is indifferent from which firm to buy and
whether or not to buy at all.
(a) For s > 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t) firms’ profits are
piG1 = (
6s−5c1−c2−3t
6
)( c2−c1+3t
6t
),
piG2 = (
6s−c1−5c2−3t
6
)( c1−c2+3t
6t
)− k.
(b) For 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t) ≥ s firms profits’ are
piG1 =
(s−c1)2
4t
,
piG2 = (
3s−c1−2c2−2t
2
)(2t+c1−s
2t
)− k.
16After inserting the equilibrium prices it follows that p1 − p2 ≤ t⇔ t ≥ c1−c23 .
17Where x˜ = p2−p1+t2t =
c2−c1+3t
6t .
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2. Acquisition
For c1 ≥ s acquisition is not feasible since by assumption there exists no
target firm. For s > c1 the same three cases as above have to be considered.
To calculate firm 2’s net profit, its monopoly pricing strategy also has to be
taken into account. For s ≥ c1 + 2t the monopolist would like to serve the
whole market and otherwise only a part of it.
Case 1: For t < c1−c2
3
the acquisition price PA will be zero.
1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t firm 2’s profit is
piA2 = s− t− c1.
2. For s < c1 + 2t the profit is
piA2 =
(s−c1)2
4t
.
Case 2: For t ≥ c1−c2
3
and s being sufficiently large, that is s ≥ 1
2
(c1+c2+3t),
the acquisition price will be PA =
(c2−c1+3t)2
18t
.
1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t the net profit of firm 2 is
piA2 = s− t− c1 − (c2−c1+3t)
2
18t
.
2. For s < c1 + 2t the net profit is
piA2 =
(s−c1)2
4t
− (c2−c1+3t)2
18t
.
Case 3: If s is not sufficiently large the acquisition price becomes in case
(a) PA = (
6s−5c1−c2−3t
6
)( c2−c1+3t
6t
) and in case (b) PA =
(s−c1)2
4t
. Thus, the net
profits for firm 2 in these cases are 18
(a) piA2 =
(3s−2c1−c2−3t)2
36t
,
(b) piA2 = 0.
18If s is not sufficiently large it follows s < 12 (c1 + c2 + 3t) < c1 + 2t. Thus, firm 2 will
always only serve part of the market using technology c1.
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C) The optimal entry mode
The superiority of one entry mode over the other will be written as an in-
equality with consumers’ surplus s on the left-hand side. In the borderline
case when greenfield investment and acquisition yield the same net post-entry
payoff, i.e. the constraint is fulfilled with equality, it is simply assumed that
acquisition will be chosen.
For c1 ≥ s only greenfield investment is feasible. The entrant will choose this
entry mode only if this is viable:
piG2 = s− t− c2 − k > 0.
Thus, for
s > c2 + t+ k (1)
firm 2 will choose greenfield investment and otherwise it will not enter the
market at all.
If firm 1 is initially in the market, i.e. s > c1, acquisition will be chosen
whenever piA2 ≥ piG2 . Solving for s and re-arranging gives a critical value s¯ for
each situation:19
Case 1: When firm 1 faces no demand in competition with firm 2, i.e. t <
c1−c2
3
, greenfield investment is viable if k < k¯ = c1 − c2 − t.
1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t acquisition is the prefered mode of entry if
s ≥ s¯ = 2c1 − c2 − k (2)
and otherwise it is greenfield investment.
2. For s < c1 + 2t acquisition is preferable if
s ≥ s¯ = c1 + 2
√
t(c1 − c2 − t− k) (3)
or greenfield investment in the opposite case.
19These values are well defined as long as k < k¯ in the respective case.
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Case 2: For t ≥ c1−c2
3
greenfield investment is viable whenever k < k¯ =
(c1−c2+3t)2
18t
.
1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t acquisition is the prefered mode of entry if
s ≥ s¯ = (c1 − c2)
2
9t
+ 2t+ c1 − k (4)
and greenfield otherwise.
2. For s < c1 + 2t acquisition is preferable if
s ≥ s¯ = c1 + 2
√
1
9
(c1 − c2)2 + t2 − tk (5)
or greenfield investment else.
Case 3: If s is not sufficiently large, s < 1
2
(c1+c2+3t), greenfield investment
is viable in case (a) if k < k¯ = (6s−c1−5c2−3t
6
)( c1−c2+3t
6t
) or in case (b) k < k¯ =
(3s−c1−2c2−2t
2
)(2t+c1−s
2t
).
(a) For s > 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t) acquisition is the prefered mode if
s ≤ s¯ = c1 + 2t− 2
√
1
9
(c1 − c2)2 + 1
2
t(c1 − c2 + t)− tk (6)
and greenfield otherwise.
(b) For 1
3
(2c1+c2+3t) ≥ s acquisition leads to a zero net profit for certain.
If greenfield investment is not viable the MNE prefers not to enter at
all. Thus, no entry will be the prefered if
s ≤ s¯ = 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 4t−
√
(c1 − c2 + 2t)2 − 12tk) (7)
and otherwise greenfield entry is viable and will be chosen.
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D) Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
We have to show that
dpiG2
dc1
> 0, dPA
dc1
≤ 0, dpiM1
dc1
< 0 is fulfilled for all cases.
(i) Case 1:
dpiG2
dc1
= 1, dPA
dc1
= 0.
Case 2:
dpiG2
dc1
= c1−c2+3t
9t
> 0, dPA
dc1
= c1−c2−3t
9t
≤ 0, for t ≥ c1−c2
3
.
Case 3: (a)
dpiG2
dc1
= 3s−c1−2c2−3t
18t
> 0, dPA
dc1
= 5c1−2c2−6t−3s
18t
< 0, for
s > 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t).
(b)
dpiG2
dc1
= 2s−c1−c2−2t
2t
> 0, dPA
dc1
= − s−c1
2t
< 0, for s ≥ {c2+2t, c1}.
(ii) For s ≥ c1 + 2t we have dpi
M
1
dc1
= −1 and dpiM1dc1 = − s−c12t < 0 otherwise.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
We have to show that
dpiA2
dc1
≤ 0 is fulfilled for all cases. Since dpiA2
dc1
=
dpiM1
dc1
− dPA
dc1
it follows from proof of Lemma 1 :
Case 1: For s ≥ c1 + 2t it is dpi
A
2
dc1
= −1 and dpiA2
dc1
= − s−c1
2t
< 0 otherwise.
Case 2: For s ≥ c1 + 2t it is dpi
A
2
dc1
= c2−c1−6t
9t
< 0 and
dpiA2
dc1
= 7c1+2c2+6t−9s
18t
< 0
otherwise.
Case 3: (a) For s ≥ 1
3
(2c1 + c2 + 3t) we have
dpiA2
dc1
= 2c1+c2+3t−3s
9t
< 0.
(b)
dpiA2
dc1
= 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We have to show that for k < k¯ there exists a c¯1(s, c2, t, k) such that green-
field investment is the optimal mode of entry for c1 > c¯1 and acquisition
otherwise. Re-arranging equations (2) - (7) with s¯ = s determines the cru-
cial value c¯1:
Case 1: 1. For s ≥ c1 + 2t the crucial value is c¯1 = 12(s+ c2 + k).
2. For s < c1 + 2t the value is c¯1 = s+ 2t− 2
√
t(s− c2 − k).
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Case 2: 1. For s ≥ c1+2t the value is c¯1 = 12 [2c2−9t+3
√
t2 + 4t(s+ k − c2)].
2. For s < c1 + 2t it is c¯1 =
1
5
[9s− 4c2 − 6
√
(s− c2)2 + 5t(t− k)].
Case 3: (a) c¯1 =
1
5
[9s− 9t− 4c2 − 3
√
4(s− c2)2 + t(2s− t− 2c2 − 20k)].
(b) c¯1 = 2s− 2t− c2 −
√
(s− c2)2 − 4tk.
By proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we know that
dpiG2
dc1
> 0,
dpiA2
dc1
≤ 0. Thus, it
follows that for c1 > c¯1 greenfield is the optimal entry mode and acquisition
otherwise. In Case 3 (b) c1 > c¯1 is always fulfilled by assumption k < k¯.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
We have to show that
dpiM1
ds
> 0,
dpiA2
ds
≥ 0 for all cases, dpiG2
ds
> 0, dPA
ds
> 0 for
s < 1
2
(c1+c2+3t), and
dpiG2
ds
= dPA
ds
= 0 otherwise. Note that
dpiA2
ds
=
dpiM1
ds
− dPA
ds
.
(i) For s ≥ c1 + 2t we have dpi
M
1
ds
= 1 or
dpiM1
ds
= s−cs
2t
> 0 otherwise.
(ii) Case 1:
dpiG2
ds
= dPA
ds
= 0;
dpiA2
ds
= 1 or
dpiA2
ds
= s−cs
2t
.
Case 2:
dpiG2
ds
= dPA
ds
= 0;
dpiA2
ds
= 1 or
dpiA2
ds
= s−cs
2t
.
Case 3: (a)
dpiG2
ds
= c1−c2+3t
6t
, dPA
ds
= c2−c1+3t
6t
> 0;
dpiA2
ds
= 3s−2c1−c2−3t
6t
> 0.
(b)
dpiG2
ds
= 2c1+c2+4t−3s
2t
> 0; dPA
ds
= s−c1
2t
> 0;
dpiA2
ds
= 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We have to show that a finite value for s¯(c1, c2, t, k) always exists when k < k¯.
Case 1: 1. For t ≤ 1
2
(c1 − c2 − k) the crucial value is s¯ = 2c1 − c2 − k.
2. For t > 1
2
(c1 − c2 − k) the value is s¯ = c1 + 2
√
t(c1 − c2 − t− k).
Case 2: 1. For t ≤ (c1−c2)2
9k
the value is s¯ = (c1−c2)
2
9t
+ 2t+ c1 − k.
2. For t > (c1−c2)
2
9k
the value is s¯ = c1 + 2
√
1
9
(c1 − c2)2 + t2 − tk.
Where equations (2) - (5) determine the values for s¯(c1, c2, t, k). We can also
determine s¯(c1, c2, t, k) in Case 3. But increasing s above s =
1
2
(c1 + c2 +3t)
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always leads to the situation in Case 2, where, as shown, an s¯(c1, c2, t, k)
exists whenever k < k¯. By proof of Lemma 3 we know that
dpiG2
ds
= 0 and
dpiA2
ds
> 0 in Case 1 and Case 2. Thus, it follows that for s ≥ s¯ acquisition
is the optimal entry mode. The intersection of the respective equation for s¯
with s = c1 + 2t or s =
1
2
(c1 + c2 + 3t) determine the case distinctions.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We have to show that t¯(c1, c2, s, k) exists for s ≥ sˆ and k ≤ kˆ. From proof of
Proposition 3 we know that for k < k¯ there exists an s¯ such that acquisition
is the optimal mode of entry. In Case 1 for s ≥ sˆ = 2c1 − c2 − k acquisition
is the optimal entry mode. It remains to show that there exists a t¯ in Case
2. Depending on the exact parameter constellations the crucial t¯ is either
t¯1 = max{c1 − c2
3
,
1
4
(s− c1 + 1
3
√
9(s− c1 − k)2 − 8(c1 − c2)2)}
or
t¯2 = max{c1 − c2
3
,
1
2
k +
1
6
√
9(s− c1)2 − 4(c1 − c2)2 + 9k2},
with t¯ = t¯1 for t¯1 ≤ 12(s − c1) and t¯ = t¯2 otherwise. Re-arranging (4)
respectively (5) yields the second part in each case.
The crucial t¯ exists for k ≤ kˆ = 18s(c1−c2)−9(c21−c22)+4(c1−c2)2
18(s−c2) and s ≥ sˆ =
max{2c1 − c2 − k, 2c2 − c1 + 2k + 13
√
19(c1 − c2)2 + 36k(c2 − c1 + k)}. The
intersection of s = c2+2t with (6) gives a maximum value for t. Substituting
the resulting t into s = c2 + 2t yields the second part of sˆ which ensures
that no entry never is an optimal decision in the considered situation. Re-
arranging t¯2 =
1
2
k+ 1
6
√
9(s− c1)2 − 4(c1 − c2)2 + 9k2 ≤ 12(s−c2) results in kˆ.
By construction of the parameter spaces greenfield investment is the optimal
mode of entry for t > t¯ and acquisition otherwise.
Q.E.D.
28
Proof of Proposition 5:
We have to show that for s ∈ (s, s˜) and k ∈ (1
3
(c1 − c2), 35(c1 − c2)] there
exist t and t˜ with the described properties. Re-arranging (3) respectively (5)
yields
t =
1
2
(c1 − c2 − k −
√
(c1 − c2)2 − k(2c1 − 2c2 − k)− (s− c1)2),
t˜ =
1
2
k +
1
6
√
9(s− c1)2 − 4(c1 − c2)2 + 9k2.
It is easy to show, that t < c1−c2
3
< t˜ for s ∈ (s, s˜) and k ∈ (1
3
(c1− c2), 35(c1−
c2)]. The value for s is equal to equation (3) evaluated at t =
c1−c2
3
and s˜
is equal to sˆ in Case 1 as described in Proposition 4. For (s, s˜) not to be
empty it must be that k > c1−c2
3
. At the same time no entry should never
be an optimal choice in the considered situation. Therefore, k should be
small enough such that s ≥ 2c2−c1+2k+ 13
√
19(c1 − c2)2 + 36k(c2 − c1 + k)
is fulfilled. This value has already been determined in proof of Proposition
4. Re-arranging yields k ≤ ( 1
72
A − 84
9
1
A
+ 4
9
)(c1 − c2) with A = (11348 +
276
√
4641)
1
3 . Thus, the upper bound for k is approximately k˜ ≈ 3(c1−c2)
5
,
with k˜ < ( 1
72
A− 84
9
1
A
+ 4
9
)(c1 − c2).
Q.E.D.
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E) Illustration of the results
Figure 1: Optimal entry mode for s = 5, c2 = 1, t = 1.
Figure 2: Optimal entry mode for c1 = 4, c2 = 1, k = 1.75.
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